DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 223 513 SO 014 383

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TITLE Student Judgments of Responsibility and the Moral Atmosphere of High Schools: A Comparative Study. Revised.
INSTITUTION Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Mass. Graduate School of Education.
PUB DATE 1 Feb 82
NOTE 67p.; Paper presented at the International Conference on Morality and Moral Development (Miami Beach, FL, December 18, 1981).
PUB TYPE Reports - Research/Technical (143) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC03 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Developmental Stages; High Schools; Moral Development; Moral Issues; *Moral Values; Nontraditional Education; Participative Decision Making; *Prosocial Behavior; Public Schools; Research Methodology; Secondary Education; *Student Attitudes; *Student Responsibility; *Value Judgment
IDENTIFIERS Kohlberg (Lawrence)

ABSTRACT

The moral judgment is assessed of high school students from three regular high schools and from three alternative high schools. Students from the alternative schools made and reinforced rules and settled issues in weekly community meetings based on participatory democracy. The study sought to ascertain the presence of responsibility judgments in the responses to the four moral dilemmas presented to participants. The hypothesis was that a judgment of responsibility is a mediating bridge between deontic judgments of rightness (in which the other's welfare seems to be a matter of right or claim) and moral action. Judgments which consider filling the other's need when it is not based on a right or claim is a responsibility concern. Democratic school students rated higher in making judgments of responsibility and in their stage of judgment; for example, they favored prosocial choice, demonstrated a high sense of collective prosocial norms, and expressed a strong sense of community. The best approach to moral education is one that attempts to reform the moral atmosphere in which individual decisions are made. (KC)

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STUDENT JUDGMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL ATMOSPHERE OF HIGH SCHOOLS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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International Conference on Morality and Moral Development, Miami Beach, Florida December 18, 1981 (Revised February 1, 1982).

SP 014 383

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the present paper, we discuss the moral judgment of groups of high school students about how they would act if certain prototypical high school moral dilemmas occurred in their school. One purpose of the study was that of formative educational evaluation. Three of the six groups of students attended public alternative schools within the larger high school. The other three attended the regular high school counterparts of these alternative schools. The three alternative schools made and enforced rules and settled issues of fairness in a weekly community meeting based on paticipatory democracy, one person, one vote whether teacher or student. The school wide democratic meeting had 60 to 90 participants, dependent upon the size of the alternative school. It was preceded by a small group discussions of the moral issues in the decisions to be made, discussions with 10 to 20 students and a teacher leader.

We expected and found individual moral stage change on our standard hypothetical justice dilemmas in the alternative school students compared with controls in the regular high schools. The upward change in individual moral reasoning was 1/4 stage per year for the alternative school students in Cambridge & Scarsdale. This is the expected change from a/ good moral discussion program. Such change, however, was not the focus of our research interest. Our focus was upon developing two related kinds of assessment. The first was an assessment of the presence of, and stage of, judgments of responsibility in the real school dilemmas. In the conference paper by Kohlberg and Candee it is hypothesized that a judgment of responsibility is a mediating bridge from a deontic judgment of rightness and justice to moral action. In the Milgram experiment, for instance it was found that higher stage subjects quit shocking the stooge victim because of a judgment of responsibility asserting that what was going on was their responsibility, not just that of the experimenter's, in spite of the experimenter's assertion that he would take the responsibility for shocking the victim.

We hypothesized that the democratic school students would both make more responsibility judgments and make them at a higher stage than the regular school controls, with standard dilemma stage controlled. There were two reasons we expected this. First participatory democracy puts sociomoral decisions in the hands of the students giving them a greater sense of responsibility for school related actions. Second participatory democracy, we believed, helps create a sense of the school as a caring community. Students would develop shared or collective norms of helping, of trust, and of active participation on behalf of the group, norms supported by a sense of community or of a valued sense of group solidarity and cohesion. Students' practical judgments of responsibility, we believed would derive from their perception of the moral atmosphere of the school, that is, by their perception of the schools norms and its valuing of community.

Having outlined our educational evaluation aims and hypothesis we should add that our theoretical interest lay in developing concepts and measures which would bridge moral psychology and sociology. According to Durkheim's Moral Education, the classroom or school group creates collective norms and attachments to the group which are group phenomena sui generis. We believed him. We thought a stage 3 collective norm is not the same thing as an average of individual's stage judgments at stage 3. In a school promoting moral development, collective norms would be formulated at a stage which was a leading edge for the group and adapting to these norms would stimulate those students whose individual stage was lower to grow. (Kohlberg, 1980, 1981, Power, 1979).

Still more basically we thought by building collective norms and ideas of community at a higher stage we would promote morally better student action. Moral action usually takes place in a social or group context and that context usually has a profound influence on the moral decision making of individuals. Individual moral decisions in real life are almost always made in the context of group norms or group decision-making processes. Moreover, individual moral action is often a function of these norms or processes. For example, in the massacre at My Lai, individual American soldiers

murdered noncombatant women and children. They did so not primarily because, as individuals, their moral judgment that the action was morally right was immature nor because, as individuals, they were "sick" in some sense, but because they participated in what was essentially a group action taken on the basis of group norms. The moral choice made by each individual soldier who pulled the trigger was embedded in the larger institutional context of the army and its decision-making procedures. Their decisions were dependent in large part upon a collectively shared definition of the situation and of what should be done about it. In short, the My Lai massacre was more a function of the group "moral atmosphere" that prevailed in that place at that time than of the stage of moral development of the individuals present. The realization of the important role that moral atmosphere or group norms play in individual moral action has led us to hypothesize that in many cases the best approach to moral education is one that attempts to reform the moral atmosphere in which individual decisions are made. This is the hypothesis that has guided our inverventions and research in the schools and prisons.

Having outlined our hypotheses we shall describe out methods and results. We will do this by quoting four prototypical members of four schools, students whose moral judgment scores are the same as the averages for their groups. Josh is a student in the Brookline regular school, Sonya in the democratic alternative school in Brookline called the School Within a School. Rick is a student in the regular Cambridge high school and Becky a student at the democratic alternative school in the Cambridge high school, the Cluster school. Their scores, are presented in Tables 1 and 2.

II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Before our case illustrations of our method and results, we need a brief review of previous work in the field on which we have tried to build.

A. Classical and Practical Moral Judgment - Leming

Our first scores in Table 1 are scores of deontic judgment on our standard dilemmas like the Heinz dilemma taps what we shall call classical moral judgments.

The standard issue scoring method used has proved to be useful for measuring individual longitudinal changes in a variety of cultures and subcultural settings. The very abstractness of the standard moral dilemmas situations helps make them a standard test stimulus having similar meanings to individuals living in various cultural worlds. Their focus on what someone is general, Heinz, should do, minimizes non-moral personality and situational variations in response which might be brought out by the question "What would you do?". As a result it yields a good picture of the student's moral judgment general competence, regardless of variations in personality and situation which might influence his specific moral judgment performance.

In addition to being abstract and hypothetical, and in addition to asking for should and not would answers our standard dilemmas are primarily dilemmas of justice. They pose a conflict between the rights of one person (Heinz's wife) and that of another (the druggist). Alternately stated they oppose one social norm (respecting property) to another social norm (respecting life). The resolution of such justice conflict requires reference to a principle, such as the utilitarian principle of the greater good or the justice principle of equal respect for each person. The rules or principles just cited are those found at stage 5, but each stage has its characteristic rules or principles of choice.

In addition to dilemmas of justice, students, also face another kind of dilemma, dilemmas of caring or responsibility. Caring dilemmas, as studied by Gilligan (1977) and Eisenberg-Berg (1976) do not put rights in conflict but put responsibilities in conflict, individual responsibility for the [illegible] of the self and social responsibility for the care and welfare of another person or a group. The resolution of such conflicts of responsibility need not always be based on a prescriptive principle like justice or utility but may involve other less structural modes of choice.

In our study of democratic schools, we were less interested in student's general moral judgment competence about justice than we were interested in how students actually made real life moral decisions in action. Research reviews by Blasi (1980) and by Kohlberg and Candee (1982) show that classical moral judgment does correlate with,

or predict to, moral action in naturalistic and experimental situations. These correlations, however, tell us little about the process of moral decision-making or about moral-judgment-in-action.

Leming (1973, 1976) started exploration of a somewhat different method for studying moral judgment related to action, the method of studying "practical" as distinct from "classical" moral judgment. According to Leming our standard dilemmas tap "classical" moral judgment, for two reasons. First, it is "classical" because of the type of dilemma, abstract hypothetical dilemmas rather than dilemmas representative of the respondents' life space, i.e. more "real life" dilemmas. Second, it is classical because it asks for deontic or prescriptive moral judgment, and a deontic judgment alone. It asks "Should Heinz or anyone have stolen the drug, was he right or wrong?". In contrast, says Leming, practical decision-making is in the deliberative mode "What will or would you do if you were in Heinz's situation?". This mode is future oriented, it is concrete (what would you do) and it is descriptive (what would you do," not simply prescriptive "what should you do?").

Real moral decision making is not only a prescription but also a description of facts of the situation and of the self's needs and motives and htose of others in an integrated deliberative practical judgment. In calling the judgment elicited by our standard test prescriptive, we may elaborate and call them in the terms of moral philosophy, deontic (Frankena, 1973) judgments of the right, or judgments of duty and obligation.

Our reasons for calling classical moral judgments deontic will become clearer after we report Leming's actual findings. Leming sets up four cells to represent his basic "practical-classical" distinction. One cell involved classical/dilemmas with prescriptive moral reasoning; one classical dilemmas with deliberative reasoning; one real dilemmas with prescriptive moral reasoning; and one real dilemmas with deliberative reasoning. Leming interviewed sixty seventh and twelfth grade students filling all four cells for each student. He used three "classical" (standard hypothetical) dilemmas, and

three "practical" (or more everyday real-life) dilemmas. The first practical dilemma centered on a choice involving deception of one's parents. A girl's parents have denied her premission to go to a friend's party. The girl's best friends were expected to be there so she told her parents that she was going to a movie and went to the party anyway. The second dilemma dealt with the issue of cheating on a school assignment, the third with a peer group conflict. Leming's results were just what he and common sense might expect. First, Leming had little difficulty in stage-scoring practical judgment, using the Kohlberg (1980) clinical issue rating system. Even though our stage descriptions were meant to classify prescriptive reasoning about justice, Leming had little difficulty classifying pragmatic exchanges in the peer group or family as Stage 2, or concerns about hurting the feelings and expectations of others as stage 3. Stage scores in classical moral judgment correlated well (r=80) with other classical dilemmas, less well with deliberative judgment on the classical dilemmas (r=70) and least well with real dilemmas deliberative judgments (r=60) (Leming 1976). Of more importance, Leming found that practical judgment was systematically lower than classical judgment. Students scoring stage 3 in classical moral judgment were often stage 2 in practical moral judgment. This corresponds to the common sense expectation that classical moral judgment taps highest competence, the moral "high road", whereas more real life practical judgment is more likely to take the "low road." It is plausible to believe that Leming's assessment of practical judgment is more likely to represent performance, i.e., real life moral decisions than is our assessment of "classical" moral judgment.

B. The Gilligan and Belenky Studies - Responsibility Reasoning in Practical Moral Judgment

In 1980, Carol Gilligan and Mary Belenky, reported in preliminary form the results of their clinical interviews with women undergoing the decision as to whether or not to have an abortion. Not only were her interviews of Leming's practical reasoning type but they were not typically framed as deontic justice dilemmas. Their framing was left to the subjects. They were typically not framed by her women subjects

as justice conflict between the fetus's right to life and the mother's rights violated by the existence of an unwanted child. Rather they were typically framed as conflicts of caring and responsibility. Gilligan interpreted that these caring and responsibility judgments emerge directly from intrinsically valued relationships or connectedness of persons not from balancing individual rights through reciprocity and contract. The intrinsically moral quality of relations per se suggested by Gilligan is somewhat like Durkheim's belief that the sheer existence of a solidary group creates moral responsibilities, obligations and aspirations.

In its initial preconventionalconstruction, the abortion decision centers on the self. The concern is pragmatic, and the issue is survival. At this level, "should" is undifferentiated from "would", and others influence the decision only through their power to affect its consequences. An eighteen-year-old, asked what she thought when she found herself pregnant, replies: "I really didn't think anything except that I didn't want it. [WHY WAS THAT?] I didn't want it, I wasn't ready for it, and next year will be my last year and I want to go to school."

Asked if there was a right decision, she says, "There is no right decision. I just didn't want it." For her question of right decision would emerge only if her own needs were in conflict; then she would have to decide which needs should take precedence. This was the dilemma of another eighteen-year-old, who saw having a baby as a way of increasing her freedom by providing "the perfect chance to get married and move away from home," but also as restricting her freedom.

In the transition to conventional morality which follows and criticizes this level of judgment, the words selfishness and responsibility first appear. The growth from childhood to adulthood, conceived as a move from preconventional selfishness to conventional responsibility, is articulated explicitly in these terms by a seventeen-year-old who describes her response to her pregnancy as follows:

> I started feeling really good about being pregnant instead of feeling really bad, because I wasn't looking at the situation realistically. I was looking at it from my own sort of selfish needs because I was lonely, I was looking at it that I could have a baby that I could take care of or something that was part of me, that made me feel good...but I wasn't looking at the responsibility I would have to take on...I came to this decision that I was going to have an abortion because I realized how much responsibility goes with having a child. Like you have to be there, you can't be out of the house all the time which is one thing I like to do...and I decided that I have to take on responsibility for myself and I have to work out a lot of things.

Thus Gilligan's analysis of women's practical judgment leads to a construction of the abortion dilemma as a conflict of responsibilities to the self, to the child to be born and to the father, responsibilities which have an obligatory power but which do not spring from correlative rights as do deontic judgments of rightness and duty. In designing our school dilemmas, we enlarged the sphere from our classic dilemmas of justice to dilemmas of care, responsibility and altruistic action. We also sensitized ourselves to listening to practical judgments made in the language of responsibility as well as in the deontic language of rightness and justice.

Gilligan's theorizing led her to distinguish between two orientations to real-life dilemmas, an orientation she calls rights or justice and an orientation she calls the ethic of care or responsibility. Lyons (1982) has developed a complex and reliable method for classifying orientations to personal moral dilemmas as either care-oriented, rights-oriented, or a mixture of both. She has found that males tend to respond more in the right orientation and females more in the care orientation but that a majority of both males and females showed use of both orientations.

The coding system developed by Lyons and Gilligan was not available at the time we scored our school dilemmas nor did the distinctions we wished to make exactly correspond to the Gilligan and Lyons notion of two independent moral orientations of rights and of care. Instead we thought that deontic judgments of rightness were often embedded in judgments of responsibility, but that judgments of responsibility went beyond deontic judgments in a number of ways. The criteria and rules which we used to define and score judgments as deontic or responsibility are listed in Table 5. Gilligan, Lyons and Langdale have just begun exploring definitions of stages in the reponsibility or care orientation. With the need to complete our project we made up rough scoring manuals for stages 2 through 4 for both deontic and responsibility judgments. A tabular summary of the responsibility stages on the school dilemmas also is given in Table 5.

C. The Scharf Study

At the same time Leming conducted his study, Kohlberg, Scharf and Hickey (1972) conducted a different study pointing in the same direction, though the interpretations at the time was different. The starting point of the Scharf (1973) study was their observations in conducting moral discussions of real and hypothetical dilemmas in a group at the Cheshire reformatory. Inmates judgment and reasoning appeared to be higher about hypothetical dilemmas, both the standard test dilemmas and the hypothetical group discussion dilemma than was their judgment about real Cheshire reformatory dilemmas.

Further they way they judged prison dilemmas in the group discussions was different than the way they reported making decisions when they were out of the group and back on the cell block.

To test out these observations, Scharf (1973) designed a set of real life or practical prison dilemmas and gave them to both the discussion group members and to the control group prisoners involved in the larger study. Like the Leming practical dilemmas, the prison dilemmas elicited much "would" or deliberative judgments as well as eliciting some deontic rights and duty judgments. If Leming found stage 3 classical moral judgments on the standard dilemmas giving way to more stage 2 judgments on the practical dilemmas, Scharf found this effect in spades in the prison. He found (Kohlberg, Scharf, Hickey, 1972, p. 6):

> "...none of the 34 inmates scored higher on the prison dilemmas than on the standard non prison dilemmas. Of the 16 inmates characterized as stage 3 on non-prison dilemmas, for example 11 were rated at stage 2 on the prison dilemmas.
>
> Inmates tended to see relationships with other inmates in stage 2 instrumental terms. Inmates were seen as 'ripping' each other off, 'ratting' out their friends and 'punking' weaker inmates. Relationships with other inmates were necessary for mutual protection; however, they were usually seen as marred by 'fronting.' 'Fronting was necessary to defend one's interests and to 'con' the guards and other inmates.

At the time these researchers did not think clearly of what their feeling migh mean for moral deliberation and action in general. Instead they saw it as a statement of what we called the moral atmosphere of the prison. More generally it indicated that practical moral judgment is not simply a product of a fixed property of the individual,

his moral competence, but is a product of the interaction between his competence and the moral features of the situation, what we term the "moral atmosphere" of the social situation in which he makes decisions.

In our view the stage 2 practical reasoning of the prisoners with stage 3 competence in classical moral judgment was more a function of the prison environment than of the prisoners as personalities. In some sense, we thought the real environment of prison guards and inmate peer groups was a stage 2 environment or moral atmosphere and inmate stage 2 practical judgment was a realistic adaptation to it. Again then, the Scharf study got closer to action or performance stage, but by tapping something that mixes the level of the environments with level of the personality. The Scharf study addressed the moral atmosphere component of practical moral judgment, but did not elaborate a systematic method for its study, as task taken up in the present study.

III. METHODOLOGY OF THE PRESENT STUDY

A. Types of Dilemmas

Table 3 presents the four school dilemmas used in the present study. All of the four dilemmas used in the current study we have classified as practical dilemmas as defined by Leming; that is, they ask about situations in their own school and they ask how students think they would reason and act and how their peers would reason and act as well as how they should reason and act.

The first two dilemmas we have labelled as prosocial-discretionary following the use of the concept prosocial put forth by Eisenberg-Berg for labelling hypothetical dilemmas given to school children. We call them discretionary because while the actions involved are usually considered to be good, the carrying out of these actions is not usually considered a duty or obligation. The first example is the caring dilemma.

The second example involved a class decision about whether to collectively restitute to a member of the class the money stolen from her pocketbook by an unknown member of the class. This involves a prosocial and discretionary action by the other members of the class for the victim.

The third dilemma is a mandatory justice dilemma which asks whether anyone should or would steal money from a purse lying open and unattended in a classroom. Obviously in a dilemma such as this there is consensual agreement by most students that it would be wrong for the protagonist to steal the money for reasons of justice, i.e., that it is a violation of the property rights of the victim. Even though a deontic justice judgmnet that it is mandatory not to steal is made, it is possible that a practical judgment to steal could be made by the self or other students.

The fourth dilemma about the use of marijuana comes close to the type that Turiel has classified as conventional. In this dilemma the prescription of not smoking arises from a particular organizational school rule rather than from inherent moral justice considerations of violating the rights of other individuals. Turiel (1980) says of conventional judgments "for an individual to regard a particular act as a transgression, he or she would have to possess culture-specific information about the act's status as a socially determined regularity. This is not the case in the moral domain." (p. 72).

Our drug dilemma does not fit the strict definition of conventionality offered by Turiel since laws have been made against it on the grounds that smoking marijuana is inherently harmful to the smoker. This inherent harmfulness however, is questioned by many adolescents and adults today.

B. The Case of Josh

The first case listed in Table 1 we shall discuss is Josh, a tenth grader in the regular Brookline High School, a school composed primarily of adolescents from the middle and professional classes. Most of the students in this school are white and most are either Jewish or Irish-Catholic ethnically. Of the 10% minority, most of the blacks are bused to the high school.

On the classical hypothetical moral dilemmas Josh was stage 3/4. This transitional stage was the median stage for the regular Bookline high school control sample.

An example of Josh's stage 3/4 reasoning is his response to the standard dilemma II

presented in Table 4. This dilemma asks whether a girl should reveal a confidence about her sister's disobedience to the mother.

SHOULD LOUISE, THE OLDER SISTER, TELL THEIR MOTHER THAT JUDY HAD LIED ABOUT THE MONEY OR SHOULD SHE KEEP QUIET?

Josh says, "Keep quiet. Lying is involved but a promise should be kept, the promise should be honored more." WHY SHOULD A PROMISE BE KEPT? Because you expect a person will keep their word and you respect them for that. Relationships won't happen without trust and respect. IS IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP A PROMISE TO SOMEONE YOU DON'T KNOW WELL AND PROBABLY WON'T SEE AGAIN? Yes, Because I would want them to do the same for me.

In these classical dilemmas it is clear that Josh has a sense of justice obligating him to keep contracts and trusts even to unrelated strangers based on Golden Rule reciprocity. His sense of obligation to an unrelated stranger is very different in our practical school dilemma 1, the caring dilemma. In answering this dilemma, Josh equates obligation with responsibility and concludes that he is not responsible to or for the stranger.

SHOULD BILLY VOLUNTEER TO DRIVE HARRY TO COLLEGE?

I don't think he has any obligation. If I was in his place, and I didn't know the kids to well, if I wanted to sleep late, I don't feel that it is my responsibility to go drive somebody to their interview, it is up to them, they are responsible. If I were going there, if I had an interview there at the same time, sure I would. But if I had the opportunity to sleep late and didn't know the kid at all, I wouldn't.

WHY IS IT NOT A RESPONSIBILITY?

It's not really that you are obligated to a person because you are more responsible to yourself and your actions. I know I have been through this year, a whole mess of garbage with my friends about driving around, since I just got my license. People seem to think as long you have a car they have a ride, and in my opinion it doesn't operate that way. If I wanted to give him a ride, I will give him a ride, if I am going there and they want to go there. It is my car and I am the one who is driving and I don't see why I should give him a ride.

YOU THINK YOU SHOULDN'T GIVE THEM A RIDE?

It doesn't mean I shouldn't give them a ride, but if I don't know them well enough, I think just out of protection for myself and my property, I wouldn't. I think people may say that being responsible to yourself is more important than other people. I think there is an extent where you put yourself first. And when you believe in putting yourself first, like I do, or try to, at least I don't feel I should be obligated to do somebody else's work, especially if I don't know them, I don't think I should give them a ride.

Josh helps us to understand the relation between two kinds of judgment, deontic judgments of duty and judgments of responsibility.

We could say one has a responsibility to drive Harry without implying Harry has a right to be driven. Responsibility is sometimes a stronger word than duty, sometimes a weaker word. Responsibility is weaker in the caring dilemma, in that I may have some responsibility to drive Harry even though prosocial caring for the other is superogatory, driving is an altruistic act beyond the call of duty. Responsibility may be a stronger word than duty in a justice dilemma. A stranger dying of cancer in the Heinz dilemma may have a right to live and I may have a duty to maintin the right. But I would not ordinarily be said to have a responsibility for the stranger's life in the sense I do for my wife's life.

Josh's introduction of his idea of responsibility into the Caring Dilemma helps us make sense of the discrepancy between the moral stage or level of his response to that dilemma and his response to the standard moral dilemma.

In the Caring Dilemma Josh understands full well the Stage 3 niceness of helping Harry. But he makes a "stage 2/3" judgment of individualistic responsibility in making his decision. A judgment of responsibility as Gilligan points out depends upon the positing of a social bond or relationship as necessary. Josh posits a relationship of friendship, but defines it in "stage 2/3 reciprocity" terms. He says "I think it really depends on the relationship of a person to the person who needs a ride. If they are good friends I don't think he has an obligation. I think it would be nice and I

know if it was my friend, if it was an important interview, he would to the same for me, then I would do it."

A brief summary of our definitions of stages in judgments of responsibility is given in Table 5.

We may note that responsibility judgments are a species of practical judgment, they are not readily elicited by our standard deontic dilemmas. Josh speedily falls into psychological or would language in explaining his idea of responsibility in the Caring Dilemma. Responsibility language is at the intersection between prescriptive moral structures and the descriptive language of an acting self.

Having said this, the question remains as to whether Josh's 2/3 response to the Caring Dilemma is due to his practical moral judugment being lower than his classical moral judgment or whether it is because his responsibility judgments are lower than his deontic judgments. In our opinion it is the latter case. We hypothesized that the stage developments of an orientation or judgment of responsibility lags behind deontic judgment if there is a discrepancy between the two. In the Caring dilemma Josh makes only a judgment of responsibility. We find Josh is consistently lower stage in his judgments of responsibility than in deontic judgments as we move from a caring situation to a justice situation, stealing, in which he makes both types of judgment.

In responding to the practical school dilemma of stealing, dilemma 3, he says, "I would leave the money there because I respect people's property because I expect them to do that to my property. I know it is a big temptation but its her money, she earned it however way she did. Besides its being against the law, its also respect of a person's property and you don't have any right to take it just because you want it. Otherwise we would have a pretty sick society with no laws and with chaos."

Josh's use of deontic justice reasoning in this response is indicated by his use of rights, of The Golden Rule and of the need to maintain social order. We score this as deontic stage 3/4 consistent with his standard moral judgment stage.

Josh' stage 2/3 responsibility reasoning comes out in the stealing situation

in his response to Dilemma 2, asking about responsibility for restitution to Mary, the victim of the theft. In reply to the idea of the whole class chipping in to help Mary because the thief is unknown, he says, "No, because ther are two reasons. One because it was Mary's fault or lack of responsibility by leaving her purse out. She was too trusting. The second thing is why should I pay for what somebody else did? Why should I get involved?". Josh also feels other students would not want to chip in. He says, "The same thing, why should they pay for what other people are doing, or other people's lack of responsibility that it got stolen."

Josh's low stage (2/3) in judgments of responsibility compared to his higher stage (3/4) judgments of justice is closely connected to his perception of the moral atmosphere of the high school. According to Josh the high school lacks collective norms for caring and responsibility and lacks a sense of community. He is asked on Dilemma 1, "Should the school have some kind of agreement or understanding that someone should help out someone else?". In response he says "I think this school really lacks that. It lacks in togetherness, I think. Nobody really takes pride in the school except a few who are good students or very good athletes. Where people don't take pride in something, go out of their way to help each other, the community doesn't really benfit. It doesn't promote the welfare of the school. Kids go vandalize alot. There is no sense of caring, helping each other."

Josh thus tells us that there are no collective norms of helping and little sense of community in his school. He responds in a similar way on the dilemma about stealing, Dilemma 3. Asked "WOULD YOU EXPRESS YOUR DISAPPROVAL AND TRY TO FIND OUT WHO TOOK MARY'S MONEY?". "It depends. I wouldn't go much out of my way, again it's her responsibility... In this school people care too much for themselves and they wouldn't really go out of their way to do something. We have alot of things stolen from lockers. Nothing seems to get done about it. In that sense I guess nobody really cares. There is a lack of trust or caring about other people's property in this school."

Josh's sense of the nonexistence of collective norms of trust and helping and his

sense of the lack of fellow students feeling or valuing community are scored in our moral atmosphere manual as 1 on the scale of the Degree of Collectiveness of Norms displayed in Table 6 and as 0 on the scale of Degree of Community Valuing presented in Table 7.

B. The Case of Sonya

In contrast to Josh let us take another tenth grader from The Brookline High School, in this case a democratic alternative school member from School Within a School, Sonya. Sonya was scored stage 3/4 on the classical dilemmas as was Josh. In contrast to him, she also scored stage 3/4 on responsibility reasoning. Her responses to the caring dilemma are quite different than Josh's. She says:

WHAT DO YOU THINK HARRY SHOULD DO?

I think he should drive him. [WHY?] Even if he doesn't like him, he is a classmate of his and he is the only one who is able to help him.

BUT BILLY WANTS TO SLEEP LATE.

Right, but he is not losing anything by it, he is losing sleep by it, but that is only one day of the week. But it is for the benefit of his classmates, it is sort of his responsibility somehow.

WHAT WOULD YOU DO IN THIS SITUATION?

I would feel that I had a moral obligation to him, but I don't know that I actually would. I would think of myself first. I might be selfish, but I would realize that I would feel guilty if I didn't do it. I can't say for sure that I would. But I would feel that I had an obligation to do it.

Sonya feels that there is a responsibility to help in a case like Harry's. Her judgment of responsibility considers filling Harry's need in a way that doesn't rest on the idea that he has a claim or right which Billy has an obligation or duty to respond to. She makes it clear that the moral obligation to help Harry arises out of his need alone and should be responded to by the person who can help in the situation. Second, in considering what she would do in the situation, she says if she wouldn't help

then she would feel guilty. This personal judgment of her moral worth tells us that for Sonya action is a necessary part of her definition of moral responsibilities. Referring to Table 5 shows Sonya's reasoning is stage 3/4.

On Dilemma 3 about stealing, Sonya focuses her concern on the reltational norm of trust. She says:

SHOULD YOUR SCHOOL HAVE AN AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING ABOUT TRUST?

Yah, I think we do have an agreement about trust. It should be an agreement that people respect everyone else's property.

WHY IS THAT IMPORTANT?

Because if you can't leave things around and trust people, then you can't really get to know them. You can't get to know a person you don't trust or relate to them and care about them, if you don't trust them and they don't trust you.

On the stealing dilemma, Josh talks about property rights and the need to respect property rights to prevent chaos in society and for the justice of keeping what one has earned. He feels that trust as a value is separate from upholding property rights. Sonya, on the other hand, is primarily concerned about trust and considers trust as a valid basis for upholding or respecting other people's property rights. Sonya relates the idea of respect for others' property to the larger issue of maintaining trust in a community. In these terms Sonya's response is primarily a responsibility judgment at stage 3/4 rather than a deontic judgment (Table 5).

Sonya's responsibility reasoning is based on a conception of her school as a community. Sonya says about caring for others in school:

WHY SHOULD PEOPLE HELP OUT?

Because they care about other people, but you can't say to someone, care about this person, but they should do it out of reasons of caring for other people and in that I really think it should be because they care about other people, but also because they care about the community.

DO YOU THINK YOUR SCHOOL SHOULD HAVE AN AGREEMENT THAT MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY SHOULD HELP OUT OTHER PEOPLE?

Not a written agreement, you can't have a written law of respect. It comes out of the atmosphere of the community. I think in SWS there is a lot more caring atmosphere and people really care about each other a lot more than in a bigger, impersonal school. You can't have a law saying that you have to respect people and help them.

Speaking as a member of the school Sonya prescribes a strongly held collective norm of caring registered as 13 on our scale of Degree of Collectiveness of Norms (see Table 6). Sonya is given a score of 4 on Degree of Community Valuing (see Table 7) because she intrinsically values community, that is, she supports the norm of caring out of concern for the community itself.

We see by reference to Table 8 that Sonya has a stage 3/4 conception of community. Sonya tells us that the collective norm of caring arises out of the "atmosphere of the community and the idea that members should care about the community as well as each other." We understand this to be a trasitional idea to a Stage 4 conception of community as a whole greater than the sum of its parts.

On the stealing dilemma Sonya also refers to a collective norm at degree 12, that there is an agreement about trust. She again grounds this in a strong sense of community (degree 4). She says "that in a community you should be able to trust people and they should be able to trust you and you should be able to have faith in other people in your community. I have faith in people in SWS. People are afraid of stealing by people in the regular school, but here I have pretty much a feeling of faithfulness in people of not taking things. Because I know them and because I trust them."

As Table 10 indicates the differences between the democratic alternative school and the regular high school are more magnified in Cambridge than in Brookline. To illustrate the differences between the two groups in Cambridge we will contrast Becky, a tenth grade student in the Cluster School, the democratic just community school and Rick, a tenth grader in the regular high school. Both Becky and Rick were also scored stage 3/4 on the hypothetical classical moral dilemmas. These students are one-half stage higher on individual moral judgment than the median of their groups which were stage 3. Both Becky and Rick are middle class students in schools where at least half of the students are working class. Ethnically Cambridge High School was 25% Black and 10% Hispanic and other minorities; Cluster School was half Black and half White in 1978.

C. The Cases of Becky and Rick.

In answer to why people in her school should help out on the caring dilemma, Becky says:

"Yes, they should because Cluster is a community.
Because you have a responsibility to the kids in this school,
even if you don't like them all that much, you are in
school and you're with them every day, you know, you
are supposed to think of them as part of the school and
part of the community, so you should do it."

Becky clearly expresses the value of community. We categorized her response as being at Level IV, the normative communal level (See Table 7). We see this way of thinking about community in her idea that the school is a community which expects members to help each other because they are all members of the same group. This implies an awareness and valuing of community which creates moral obligations and norms. The Interviewer asks:

WHAT DOES IT MEAN, IT DOES SOUND KIND OF CORNY, BECAUSE IT SOUNDS LIKE A CLICHE WHEN YOU SAY IT, WE ARE A COMMUNITY, SO WE ARE SUPPOSED TO HELP EACH OTHER?

Becky says:

"Because everyone is supposed to be one, it is our school, it is not a school that all these separate people go to that don't care about each other."

Becky's response indicates three aspects of this level of community valuing. First is the idea that a community implies a strong degree of unity, a oneness, or solidarity. Second it expresses the idea of personal identification with the group and its objectives, "its our school." Third is the feature that membership in the group means mutual caring about one another as group members. She also clearly indicates the existence of a shared or collective norm of helping. She says,

"Anyone who is in Cluster knows they should help out...there is the general feeling and everyone knows that."

SHOULD SOMEONE HELP OUT?

"Yes, they should because Cluster School is a community. Because you have a responsibility to the kids in this school. You are supposed to think of them as part of the school and part of the community, so you should do it."

Becky's response depicts a group with a high degree collective norm, degree $_{14}$ (see Table 6). Her statement exemplifies the three aspects of the highest two levels of the collectiveness of the helping norm. When Becky says "you are supposed to", she is speaking as one member of a collective to other members of the collective and she is representing the point of view of the group as a whole. This aspect of her response we call <u>speaker's perspective</u>, a perspective ranging from speaking from the standpoint of oneself as an individual to speaking from the standpoint of we - the members of the group. At the highest level speaking from the point of view of the group becomes explicit, taking the form of "we think we should...".

Becky is level $_{14}$ because her command of "you have a responsibility to the kids in this school" doesn't come from her as an individual, but is a statement from the perspective of the group representative of the collective norm. The speaker perspective

defines the group for whom the subject is speaking or representing. The group constituency defines the group membership of the persons to whom the subject is speaking or prescribing a rule or action. In this example it is clear to whom Becky is speaking; she is prescribing to the members of the Cluster School. In our system constituency is either individual or a specified group. Levels 1 through 3 represent the individual as the constituent and levels 4 through 15 specify a particular group as the constituency.

The third aspect is that the norm is stated prescriptively in terms of an obligation at the higher levels. We distinguish norms which are prescriptive from norms which are aggregate or stated as descriptive of the behavior of individuals or groups. Aggregate norms reflect a "statistical tendency" rather than a clearly shared idea of obligation.

In contrast to Becky, Rick a student of the regular Cambridge High school does not see a shared valuing of community, but it is not clear whether he sees the school as a valued organization serving learning and other goals. He individually values the school but others do not.

"I don't consider this school a community. Too many people hold grudges against each other, because maybe they look different or act different. Or some kinds come to school to be with their friends or to be stoned, and some kids come to do work. Like the kids who get stoned might stand around and see someone with alot of books walk by and laugh. But they won't laugh when graduation comes. No, most people think of themselves, really."

HOW DO YOU THINK THINKING ABOUT THE COMMUNITY WOULD AFFECT THAT?

"If they did think about it, I don't really know, because I don't know if they ever did, like I said only people in committees and stuff would think about it and talk about it, and those would be a small minority."

IN HANDLING ISSUES ABOUT RESPECTING OTHER PEOPLE'S PROPERTY AND TRUSTING OTHER PEOPLE, DO YOU THINK CRLS IS REALLY A COMMUNITY?"

"Well not really, because in a way like we own this school and alot of kids mess it up. Like write on the walls, there is no need for that, there is paper to write on. I don't know, some people do and some people don't. I don't really know the percentage."

These comments indicate that Rick is degree I in his thinking about the value of the school (see Table 7). He, as an individual, attaches some value to the school as an organization and says "in a way like we own this school and alot of kids mess it up." He feels some ownership of the school and finds vandalism or injury to it offensive. He also values its major function, academic learning, even though he sees many other students as not. Thus, there is a contrast between his individual valuing of the school as an organization and his perception of the attitudes of most of the students in this regard. Moreover, Rick does not perceive any shared norm of helping. He believes that it would be a good thing to have a shared norm to help but he doesn't believe that it exists. When asked if his school should have a shared agreement to help out he says:

"Yah, right. Like it is not a law, but everybody knows that it is good to help someone out. But people just don't care about anybody else."

Going on the theme of a lack of a sense of community and caring at the high school he comments that:

"Seventy-five percent of them wouldn't care."

WHY?

"They are worried about their own problems probably."

Rick himself as an individual holds a norm of helping but he is conspicuously aware of the discrepancy between his individual norm of helping and the absence of any collective norm of helping.

WHAT SHOULD THE AGREEMENT BE AND WHY SHOULD IT BE SUCH AN AGREEMENT?

"It's really - it should be an agreement with yourself, you know. It is like, I have strong feelings toward other people. I don't like to think bad things and I never say anything bad about anybody, and it is more of an agreement with yourself than with anybody, you couldn't make an agreement with somebody about something like this."

Not only is Rick aware of the discrepancy between his individual norm of helping and the lack of any collective norm, but also his response indicates that he thinks it is impossible to develop shared moral norms on issues such as helping. This is scored as Degree I on our scale, explicit rejection of the possibility of developing a shared norm (see Table 6).

The statements by Rick that "I just believe in helping people" and "it should be an agreement with yourself" demonstrate clearly that he is speaking only for himself rather than from a "we perspective" as is involved in the higher levels. His responses indicate that his idea that one should help is not defined in terms of a specific group, like members of the school, who should follow the norm and be the persons toward whom help is directed. He sees that any "good person" would hold this norm for him or herself. His norm does not define a group constituency, a bounded group of people where responsibilities are felt toward one another. For Rick the idea of helping is not obligatory or prescriptive but is a positive value that is based on a concern or caring for others. When this concern is absent, he sees no possibility for expecting someone to help out another person. Accordingly Rick's conception of the norm of helping is non-prescriptive.

While Rick doesn't see a positive collective norm of helping, he does perceive a counter norm in this situation which makes helping an unpopular student disapproved of by the peer group.

WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

"I would wait till after class, I would keep it quiet so nobody might know about it, and then I could help the kid. Then nobody would say anything to me, because they would not know about it."

Rick's feeling that he would help but in a way so that others didn't know about it indicates he is concerned about disapproval for helping presumably because of the existence of a peer group norm which makes it "uncool" to associate with or aid an unpopular student.

For example, when Rick says he would be secretive about helping he is responding to his daily observation that students do not help their unpopular classmates. The consistancy of his observation shows both Rick and ourselves that there exists an aggregate counternorm. This aggregate norm of not helping influences Rick's behavior but it is not obligatory in the same sense as Becky's articulation of the norm of helping. Explicit shared agreements in a group have obligatory force whereas the power of statistical or "average" behaviors do not. Aggregate norms arises out of a concern to fit into the average behavioral pattern of one's peers.

Assigning the degree of collectiveness or sharedness to the way Becky and Rick perceive the norm of helping in each of their schools still does not tell us the extent to which the norm is upheld by either the students or his peers. Table 9 describes another dimension in the perception of school norms, the dimension of phase of commitment to upholding the norm. The phase of the norm came to be defined when we were observing Cluster School's community meetings in terms of the development of its norms over time.

In our observations of the development of collective norms from meeting to meeting and from year to year in the Cluster School, we identified a dimension of phase of commitment to and institutionalization of the norm which could be distinguished from the existence or degree of collectiveness of the norm itself. Our scheme describes the evolution of collective norms going through distinct phases from the time they were first proposed to the time they were expected and upheld.

We designed a set of questions about phase intended to form a Guttman scale. In a Guttman scale saying yes to a question implies having said yes to all the lower

items of questions in the scale. For example, the highest point in our Guttman scale of phase is expressed willingness to publicly sanction a member for violating a norm. The Guttman scale notion implies that anyone who passes or says yes to this e.g. phase six - willingness to publicly express disapproval to a member for violating a norm, says yes to all less extreme phases of commitment to the norm.

On the caring dilemma Becky says that the Cluster School holds its collective norm of helping at phase six. She says "They would disapprove...I think the kids would be very mad at him if he didn't do it. They would have said something (to Billy)...because of why it's important to do it (that is to help) and why they would bitch at him for not doing it."

Comparing Rick's responses on the caring dilemma to Becky's response, we said that he perceives his school as having no shared expectations of helping. It is always the case that when a norm is perceived to be at a low degree of collectiveness (degree 5 or below) that the phase will be zero or nonexistent. On the caring norm, Rick is Degree I and says "you couldn't make an agreement with somebody about something like that." When he was asked "should there be an agreement?", he said "It wouldn't get followed anyway." These statements tell us three things; that there is no existing agreement in Cambridge Rindge and Latin to help (a Phase 3 idea). That there is no shared ideal of helping (a Phase 2 idea), and that Rick feels it would be unrealistic to propose such an agreement (a Phase 1 idea).

The remaining concepts in analyzing "moral atmosphere" using individual interview material are the stage of the representation of the collective norm and the stage of the representation of community valuing.

We define the stage of representation of the collective norm as the stage the individual uses to explain how most people in the school understand the meaning of the particular norm. Becky represents the stage of Cluster's schools' collective norm of caring as being 3/4. She says, "This school is supposed to be a community.

Because you have a responsibility to the kids in this school, even if you don't like them all that much. you are in school and you are with them everyday, you know, you are supposed to think of them as part of the school and part of the community, so you shoulddo it." Furthermore, Becky understands the school community in a transitional 3-4 sense, as being an entity separate from the individual's that make it up. Becky's response illustrates that both the norm of caring and the value of community can be stage scored. The stages of the collective norm and value of community are presented in Table 8.

While we distinguish for analytical purposes an individual's stage of the collective norm and the stage of the community value, on any particular school dilemma these are almost always the same.

As we discussed earlier, speaker perspective is important in defining the degree of collectiveness of a group norm. It is equally important in determining what responses in an interview are stageable representations of the collective norm rather simply than the individual's own stage of reasoning. The speaker perspective defines <u>for</u> whom, the subject is speaking or representing. Thus it helps us identify the material representative of the collective norm. When a subject, like Becky, speaks <u>to</u> the group on <u>behalf</u> of the group and does so prescriptively, we identify and use that material as indicative of <u>the</u> collective norm. Material isolated in this way, furthermore, generally has clear stageable characteristics. In other words, the way we assess the structure or stage of the collective reasoning is parallel to the way we assess the structure or stage of an individual's reasoning.

After Becky prescribes that Cluster School members should uphold their own norm of caring, she then states an exception when she as an individual would not uphold this norm. She says, "The only way I would say he shouldn't help him is if he was a creep and he really did something rotten to him in the past, if he showed he didn't care about Billy or anyone else, then I wouldn't help him out." In this statment Becky is prescribing only for herself; she is specifying for herself the

conditions and reasons for which she would not uphold the norm under certain circumstances. Her individual reasoning in this case is stage 3. She feels no obligation to help someone who has in the past violated the group's shared expectations of caring.

Contrasting Rick's interview with Becky's, we know that on the caring dilemma, there is no collective stage of a norm of helping because, Rick tells us that there is no collective norm. He does this in two ways. First, in response to the question "Should there be an agreement about helping," Rick says, "Yeh right...like it is not a law but everybody knows that it is good to help somebody out but people just don't care about anybody else; it should be an agreement with yourself you know. It's like...I have strong feelings towards other people. I don't like to think bad things and I never say anything bad about anybody and it is more of an agreement with yourself than with anybody, you couldn't make an agreement with anybody about anything like this." In his response Rick denies the possibility of even establishing a collective norm in C.R.L.S. and tells us that he can only speak for himself. Second, Rick points out that although the Director of Student Affairs "would like kids to feel that they should help each other out" only a few kids feel that way. Thus there is no collective norm of caring to be staged. This material is, however, stageable, it reflects Rick's own stage 3 reasoning that good people should try to help others, a stage score assigned to his individual norm of helping.

However, remembering that Rick did report an aggregate counter norm in his school, one that said its "uncool" to be seen helping an "unpopular" student, he represents it as being moderately collective (Degree 8) and at a very high phase (phase 6); he believes people would actually say he shouldn't help if they saw him doing it. Although assigning stage to counter norms is ambiguous since they are descriptions of behavior often times given without any justification, we feel we can assign global stage scores. In this case Rick is representing a counter norm against helping that seems to be stage 2 or 2/3. The important point is tha

we and Rick agree that it is clearly lower stage than his own individual norm of care, which is stage 3. Rick's representation of the stage of community valuing is also 2 or 2/3. He describes the school as an institution which is legitimately used by some for their own academic ends and abused by others for arbitrary and personal reasons.

Now turning to Rick and Becky's responses on school dilemma 2 about collective restitution, we will quickly run through our assessment procedure.

When Becky is asked:

WOULD THERE BE A GENERAL FEELING OR EXPECTATION IN THE CLASS THAT EVERYONE SHOULD PITCH IN 50¢?

"Yes, because the reason why is it is just easier that way, first of all, and it's there, and if something like that is going to happen at the school, the school should be responsible for it, the kids."

WHY IS THAT FAIR?

"It is fair because if everyone gets away with stealing and no one cares here, then it just can't be a good place, first of all. If people think everything is everyone else's tough luck and it is too bad that happened, then this place would be a very caring place. Stealing from someone in the community is just like stealing from the community."

WOULD THAT MAKE IT AN UNFAIR PLACE?

"Sure, it would make it a very unfair place."

WHY?

"Because some people have better luck than other people. Some people have more or less and some people are bigger and can get their way more and if that is the way it worked, then it would be very unfair."

IF THE TEACHER ASKS THE KIDS TO CHIP IN AND SOME KIDS SAY THEY WILL NOT, WHAT SHOULD THEY DO?

"They should chip in. But if they won't, they are not really in a community, they don't care. You have to do what the majority wants to do, or else we would have no school and it would be very unorganized and nothing goes right."

From these responses we say that there is an explicit shared norm of collective restitution at degree 14. Becky speaks prescriptively as a member of the community in explaining that the norm should be upheld in order to affirm the community qua community. Thus, the degree of community valuing is 4. The phase of this norm is not explicitly stated but we know it is at least phase 4, that Becky expects people to act consistently with the majority vote to chip in. The norm of collective restitution and the degree of community valuing as represented by Becky are both stage 3/4. She argues that because individuals in the school may have differential advantages that the school must be equally responsible to all its members and that the way to be responsible is to act according to the majority will.

Rick, on the other hand, has very little to say about collective restitution or even about what the teacher could do to help the victim of a classroom theft to get her money back. Moreover, although Rick has made the deontic judgment that it is wrong to steal, it doesn't help him decide whether he would report a friend who did steal. He says:

DO YOU THINK ZEKE SHOULD REPORT TOM FOR THE THEFT?

"If he is his friend, he won't. I don't know."

NO ONE IN THE CLASS ADMITS TO TAKING THE MONEY OR KNOWING WHO DID, WHAT SHOULD THE TEACHER DO.

"He can't really do anything. There is nothing he can do."

IF YOU WERE IN ZEKE'S POSITION, WOULD YOU TRY TO PERSUADE YOUR FRIEND TO RETURN THE MONEY?

"Definitely, because I don't just care about myself, I care about other people, probably the girl doesn't care about the money either, but just cares that somebody had the gall enough to take it right there in the room, you know. I'd persuade him to give him the money back for that sake, too."

IF YOUR FRIEND REFUSED TO RETURN THE MONEY, WOULD YOU REPORT HIM?

"No."

WHY NOT?

"Because he did it, I don't know. I don't feel obliged to do it, I don't feel I should."

SHOULD YOU REPORT HIM?

"I guess so, I'm not really sure, Zeke should I guess."

WHY?

"Because it (stealing) is against my conscience, it is against what I believe in."

SHOULD THE CLASS ALL CHIP IN TO REPAY MARY HER MONEY?

"No."

WHY NOT?

"Because the class didn't steal it, just one person did."

WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

"If I was in the class and it got stolen, I would just ask everybody, I wouldn't accuse anybody. There is nothing I could really do except for that."

SHOULD A GOOD MEMBER OF YOUR SCHOOL BE WILLING TO CHIP IN?

"No."

IF THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT THAT STUDENTS SHOULD DO THAT, WOULD MOST STUDENTS CHIP IN WILLINGLY?

"No, not willingly."

DO YOU THINK THIS SCHOOL SHOULD HAVE AN AGREEMENT THAT EVERYONE SHOULD CHIP IN IN SITUATIONS LIKE THIS?

"Nope."

Again Rick tells us there is no collective norm of restitution of any form in his school. He does reiterate his individual norm (degree 4) of caring about other people, here scored as stage 3. From Rick's responses we learn that the moral atmosphere of the regular high school does not contain any ideas or norms of restitution. Thus no degree of collectiveness, degree of community valuing, stage or phase scores can be assigned for this dilemma. From Rick's answers on the

stealing dilemma, 3, we hear again about his individual norm against stealing represented at stage 3 and at phase 5, an expression of personal disappointment that stealing occurs in his school.

When asked whether he should or would be trusting in his school, he says:

WOULD YOU BE AS TRUSTING AS MARY ABOUT YOUR POSSESSIONS?

"I have been bringing a skateboard to school and I have really been thinking about leaving it in my locker, because I know someone in the voc ed school that I went to for a year, they used to break in the lockers all the time and I kind of never used a locker for that reason and I only use a locker for my books. I was - when nobody was looking, I put my skateboard in there, because I don't trust some people."

DO YOU THINK YOU SHOULD BE TRUSTING ABOUT LEAVING STUFF IN THIS SCHOOL?

"You should be, but you can't be."

WHY CAN'T YOU BE?

"Because there are people who do steal and people who will steal outside of school will do it in school, too, because I know people who have done it."

The norm of trust is scored as degree 1 of collectivness, an explicit rejection of the possibility of having a shared norm of trust. Therefore the phase is 0. The degree of community valuing implicit in this passage is 0, no feeling that the school is valued even as an educational institution to foster individual academic achievement. The stage of reasoning Rick uses to describe his school and his own lack of trust we can loosely call stage 1/2.

D. <u>The Cases of Debbie and John - Scarsdale</u>

Our next set of comparisons is between two students in Scarsdale, New York, Debbie who is a junior (?) in the regular public high school and John, who is a student at the just community alternative school associated with the public school system. Like our other typical students, Debbie and John both scored stage 3/4 on the standard hypothetical moral judgment dilemmas.

On the caring dilemma, Debbie thinks Billy should volunteer to drive Harry to college. She says "I think he should volunteer, personally, because its pretty important and I think someone should do that for Harry just to help him. I feel you should help out someone, even if you don't like them you should help them. If I were in the situation and had a car, I'd probably drive him if he was really in a bind. He's got no other way of getting there and its the right thing to do."

WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY ITS THE RIGHT THING TO DO?

> Well if I was in that situation I'd want a ride.
> Especially in Scarsdale, its really in intellect school
> and college interviews are really important here.

Debbie's response to this part of the interview was scored as stage 3 in the deontic mode of judgment. Her choice is made in the mode of rightness and is based on an idea of fairness as The Golden Rule, if I were in that situation I'd want a ride. While this is Debbie's personal solution, she does not think that there is a collective norm at The Scarsdale High School supporting this choice. Therfore her helping norm is an individual one scored level 4 on degree of collectiveness. When she was asked

WHAT DO YOU THINK MOST PEOPLE IN THE SCHOOL WOULD DO?

> I don't think they'd drive them. I think they'd think more
> of themselves. They have been taught and have grown up thinking
> only about themselves. They hare learned that. I think if its
> a friend they could do it; do a favor for a friend. If its someone
> they don't like, I don't think they'd do it. They'd think, why should
> I do this guy a favor, he didn't do anything for me.

In talking about other students in the school, then, Debbie does not see any general collective norm of helping but instead sees an alternative norm of helping only your friends which is stage 2/3 since it is articulated as "why should I do this guy a favor, he didn't do anything for me." For her own response at stage 3, she uses the general idea of The Golden Rule, do unto others as you would wish to be done by. Her judgment of the aggregate thinking of students in the school is much closer to a stage 2 exchange of favors.

With regard to the idea of a collective norm of helping, Debbie's response is phase 1, proposing it as a nice ideal. When asked

DO YOU THINK YOUR SCHOOL SHOULD HAVE AN AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING ABOUT HELPING?

I think there should be an agreement. Here in the school it should be like a different family; to be involved. There should be some kind of bond between the children in the school but I don't think there is in Scarsdale.

Debbie's view that there should be a helping norm in Scarsdale, but that there is none is tied to her notion that she holds an ideal of community but which does not in fact exist as a shared value in the high school. Of her ideal community which is scored level III and stage 3, she says..."In the school it should be like a different family....there should be some kind of bond...you spend a lot of time in school and I think it should be alot friendlier.

Of the actuality of community feeling in Scarsdale, she says this is limited to positive feelings with special cliques. She says,

Scarsdale is very grouped with cliques. If you're outside the clique, they don't care about you. Scarsdale is really rich and I'm from the country and its alot different in the country. Here they are very sheltered and cliquish and they don't understand what life and helping people is all about even if you don't like them.

Debbie here is expressing not only her sense of the low level of valuing community at Scarsdale scored as level I but her feeling of relative newness and isolation in the high school. She says,

It's really hard for me to answer, because I'm not real friendly with too many people in the school.

Debbie's response to the dilemma about stealing, answering questions in the practical reasoning mode is "Tom would probably take the money from Mary's purse because it's there and she's not there. He doesn't think about her feelings. He thinks she's rich enough to afford it. I'm not rich enough to afford it so give it to me. Rob from the rich and give to the poor. I think I'd take it." Asked

WHAT WOULD YOU DO IF YOU WERE IN TOM'S SITUATION?

I know I'd be tempted to if it was just sitting here. But stealing is wrong, its their property. I wouldn't steal even if I was tempted. I've been stolen from and I know the feelings of the other person. Most people who steal don't really think about the other person. They don't think about their feelings.

As in the caring dilemma, what Debbie says she would do is determined by the deontic wrongness of stealing seen in terms of stage 3 about The Golden Rule, thinking about how you would feel if you were stolen from.

In terms of her perception of the existence of a collective norm of property and against stealing, Debbie sees none. She does feel that she and others think stealing is wrong and hold to that as an individual norm (Level 4). When asked

WHAT WOULD MOST PEOPLE IN THE SCHOOL DO IN TOM'S POSITION?

> In Scarsdale, I think they'd probably take it. There are always certain people who wouldn't, maybe three out of four who realize that it is wrong. A lot of people would take it but a lot of people wouldn't take it because they think it is really a bad thing to do.

Debbie does not see the possibility of developing a norm of trust.

DO YOU THINK YOU SHOULD BE AS TRUSTING AS THE GIRL IN THE STORY?

> I think you should be able to, but I don't think that could ever happen anymore, maybe 50 years ago. The world is past that. There has been too much stealing. People have changed. Stealing is more common, especially in this school there is pretty much stealing. It is unnecessary, they don't need it. I have had material things stolen, things they obviously didn't need. It's just something they want, so just take it.

IS THERE ANY EXPECTATION HERE THAT PEOPLE DO TRUST EACH OTHER OR ARE SUPPOSED TO?

> I think that's impossible, expecially in this school. I don't think it is possible to get some kind of an agreement and I don't think you should even try to do it. I wouldn't trust anybody but obviously you should be able to trust somebody not to take your things.

With regard to a norm of trust, Debbie's perceptions are scored level 1 of collectiveness. That its not even possible to propose or initiate a shared norm of trust. This is consistent with her sense that there is no valuing of community in the Scarsdale high school.

Turning now to the dilemma about restitution of a classroom theft, Debbie is asked,

SHOULD ZEKE PERSUADE HIS FRIEND, TOM, TO RETURN THE MONEY?

Ya, he should persuade him but I don't think he should bust him if he's a friend, but I think he should, ya. If you're not going to get in trouble with your teacher. A lot of teachers say you don't have to give your name, just let it appear on the desk and I think he should persuade him to do that, if he's not going to get in trouble. I don't think a friend should tell another friend to give it back and get busted.

THERE'S TWO ISSUES, ONE IS REPORTING A THEFT THAT YOU SAW AND THE OTHER IS THAT THIS PERSON IS YOUR FRIEND?

I think the trusting friendship is more important. I really do cause what else do you have. These people are by you through thick and thin and this may be thick. I think they should stick by you. He might persuade him to give it back but I don't think he should go as far as telling on him. Let it be on Tom's conscience.

WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE SHOULD PART OF IT?

I guess in a society they should tell so the girl can get her money back, but I personally think that the friendship interest is more important. That should be the right thing, so she can get her money back. Someone steals, someone tells. I guess it's whether you value the friendship and trust more than trust for others. Still I think that should happen but it wouldn't in the country these days.

With regard to reporting a friend, Debbie is conflicted between two modes of judgment; one mode of judgment is deontic asking what's right forpeople in society to do? This mode, scored stage 3/4, is in conflict with the responsibility mode of judgment which centers on friendship and is guess scored stage 3 or 3/4. Debbie's own judgment favors the responsibility mode and the alternative norm of being loyal to a friend even though to a certain degree she recognizes that the stage 3/4 norm of reporting is more generalizable and preferable from a societal point of view.

Unlike Becky cited earlier, Debbie thinks that collective restitution is unfair and should not be suggested because it is holding all responsible for the misdeed of one.

IF NO NO ADMITS TO TAKING THE MONEY OR KNOWING WHO DID IT, SHOULD THE CLASS ALL CHIP IN TO RE-PAY MARY HER MONEY?

No. I don't think other people should have to pay for a crime one person did. I wouldn't want to chip in. I don't have enough money to do that.

AND YOU DON'T THINK PEOPLE SHOULD HAVE TO DO A THING LIKE THAT?

No. They're not stealing it as one person. I don't think they should have to pay it back as one person.

Debbie's response is in the deontic mode, she makes no judgment of social responsibility. Her reasoning is guess scored stage 3/4 since it implied a differentiation of individual from group responsibility and implied that collective restitution doesn't recognize individual responsibility. Debbie's strong belief that collective restitution is unfair is scored as level of collectiveness 2, the level of individual conscience. The phase is 0.

In summary with regard to Debbie's responses to the caring, stealing and collective restitution dilemmas, she is quite similar to the Cambridge and Brookline regular high school students already discussed. Of particular interest in the Scarsdale situation are student orientations to the drug dilemma. In terms of both the hypothetical "should" dilemma and in terms of what she would do in this dilemma, Debbie responds using stage 3/4 deontic reasoning. When asked,

SHOULD BOB REFUSE TO SMOKE?

Ya, I think he should because if they made an agreement I think they should stick by it. For the high school, I think for anyways, I think if there was that agreement, I think they should stick by it. I don't think he should smoke dope, I think he should just not be involved, but if they want to take the consequences, if they want to take the chance, I would just say, no, I feel I should stick by the agreement.

SO THAT'S WHAT YOU FEEL YOU SHOULD DO TOO?

I think I just should walk away. Not be mean, but no, no, I don't want to, I'll wait until I get back. It's kind of ridiculous. You're just on this outing for a little while and you should be able to convince yourself that you can stick by an agreement and not smoke until you get back. It's kind of ridiculous, but a lot of people would smoke.

With regard to the existence of a collective norm, Debbie feels to a certain degree there is such a norm but one of a degree different than those we have previously discussed. Debbie's reason for sticking by her agreement is based in her acceptance of the teacher's authority. This is captured in degree of collectiveness 7 on Table 6.

She says when asked about shared expectations of not smoking on a retreat:

> To each other and to the teachers, I think there is. I know people who would but I wish they wouldn't cause they are going, if they get caught, they are going to take away privileges for the rest of us, and I think if you're making an agreement with teachers, they are being nice enough to take you up there. I think you should be able to handle it, sticking by the agreement.

As she perceives the collective norm it is stage 3, a concern for maintaining the expectation of teachers who are being nice and for not causing harmful consequences to other individual members of the school group which would occur if infractions came to the attention of teachers.

Debbie perceives that not everyone accepts the teacher's authority; her assessment of the group is scored as degree of collectiveness 6 which doesn't demand explicit acceptance.

> SO YOU PERSONALLY WOULD EXPECT PEOPLE TO REFUSE TO SMOKE, YOU WOULD HAVE THAT EXPECATION OR JUST A HOPE?
>
> A hope. I know a lot of people that would, but I also know people that wouldn't.

While Debbie thinks there is some degree of a collective norm, the phase of the norm is low, phase 2, indicating Debbie thinks it would be better or ideal if everyone followed the rule against marijuana smoking. The low phase of her perception of the collective norm is revealed by her thinking about enforcement of the norm, either by attempting to persuade others not to smoke or by considering reporting them. As we noted earlier she said she should just walk away, not be mean, and wait to smoke until after the retreat. Since she doesn't think the norm is generally accepted, she feels attempts at persuasion would be ineffective.

> DO YOU THINK WOULD YOU OR DO YOU THINK MOST PEOPLE TRY TO PERSUADE OTHER PEOPLE NOT TO SMOKE?
>
> I might say a couple of things, but I wouldn't go into a big long lecture on how they shouldn't do it. They have already chosen to do it and I don't think I would change their mind. I'd tell them what I thought but I don't think I'd be able to stop them.

Debbie's perception of the phase of the norm does not include reporting other students.

WOULD YOU REPORT SOMEBODY IF THEY WERE SMOKING AND YOU SAW THEM?

Personally, no. I don't think it's right. I just can't see myself knocking on someone.

As was true for Josh and Rick, the regular high school students, Debbie's judgments on all three dilemmas are in the deontic mode. Since she does not feel part of a community with collective norms of trust, caring and group welfare, she relies on her individual judgment of rightness. Turning now to John, The Scarsdale Alternative School student, we see that he uses both modes of reasoning in solving these school dilemmas.

Let us compare Debbie with John, a student in the Scarsdale Alternative School who is also stage 3/4 on the standard hypothetical dilemmas.

On the caring dilemma, John responds both in the deontic and the responsibility modes at a stage 4 level.

SHOULD BILLY VOLUNTEER TO DRIVE HARRY TO THE COLLEGE?

Definitely, sure, I think he should.

IN YOUR SCHOOL ALSO, YOU THINK YOU SHOULD AND WOULD HELP?

It's inherently good to help somebody. I think it's just that helping people is a positive thing, If you can help somebody and you should help somebody, there should be a law to help people, I would just go along with that. It's an unwritten code that you do help people here. I mean people are here to work together and it's good because that's one of the reasons they came here, to work together. People do favors for you. Obviously, that's a good thing. I don't think there should be a written code that a person be mandated to do something;however, I think it is important that there are caring people who would be willing to help. I think it's an important thing to happen. Also, I think it's important to have because it helps run the school. The school functions well if people want to help each other.

In the deontic mode, John thinks there should be an analogy to a law to help people because the school only functions well if people want to help each other. This view of helping as a necessary norm for effective institutional functioning we scored stage 4. It also indicates a level 4 of valuing the community for its own sake. He also views helping and caring as intrinsically valuable, "its just a positive thing" which is part of a caring community. It involves the response to need. He says, "Its a person in need and it wouldn't be putting me out that much and its a kind thing

to do. And I could help therefore, I probably would."

In response to the issue of Harry's unpopularity, John says, "Harry might be putting on a facade in front of his friends and the people in the school. And if Billy gets to know him by driving him, a friendship could be formed. I have a couple of very close friends who are not very popular but they are very caring human beings and its possible that he could be misunderstood by his peers."

We also saw this aspect of John's response as indicating a stage 4 judgment of responsibility that focusses on the underlying intrinsic potential for caring of another human being rather than on a facade perhaps used in peer relationships.

John thinks that students in his school would help out someone like Billy because he perceives the group to have a strong collective norm of helping.

WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT IT IN SAS?

I think there would be a good percentage of people that would help out, if they were in his situation.

DO YOU THINK YOUR SCHOOL SHOULD HAVE AN AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING THAT PEOPLE SHOULD HELP OUT IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION?

I guess it's an unwritten law. It's...there is an agreement of, when people come here they all come here to work together. I guess that's just, that's coming out of working together and helping people. Especially if you're not going to be put out of your way that much.

SO YOU'RE SAYING THERE ALREADY IS LIKE AN UNWRITTEN LAW HERE ABOUT THIS?

No question about it. People try to help you out many times. There are many students that came up to me at the beginning of the year. I was very, not that I was shy, but I didn't know a lot of people here. There are people that came up to me and just started talking and if I needed help of things like that they were very willing to offer.

In describing the norm of helping, John speaks as a member of a community that has an "unwritten law" that people help each other. Because he speaks as a member of his own group about a clearly collective norm, the level of collectiveness is 13. The stage of the collective norm is 4 because it involves the recognition of a contractual structure in which helping other individuals is seen in the service of creating a community of people cooperating or working together.

The phase of his perception and commitment to the collective norm of helping is phase 6, Asked whether he would be disappointed if someone could have helped but didn't, he responds,

Definitely. I would be disappointed in that person.

WOULD YOU EXPRESS THAT DISAPPOINTMENT IN ANY WAY?

Most probably, yes. However, this is a hypothetical situation. If it happened to be a person that I didn't get along with totally, first of all I might think that that was part of his character, and second of all, if I found it difficult to talk to him before, I probably wouldn't. However, if it was someone that I felt I could go and talk to without any problem, like most of the people in this school, then I would definitely go and voice my opinion. I'd say, yeh, that wasn't really very nice of you. You're being very selfish.

John's perception of the group's commitment to upholding the norm is equally high phase (6).

WOULD MOST PEOPLE HERE TALK TO THEM?

No question about it. People here are very kind and feeling people who try to help people if they can. And I think they would probably mention it.

Going on to the dilemma about stealing property and trusting others, John stresses deontic reasoning.

WHAT DO YOU THINK SOMEONE LIKE TOM WOULD TO IN THIS SITUATION?

Well, just thinking about it, I think he's immoral. I know that I wouldn't even think about taking it. What I'd probably do is zip up the pocketbook, so no one else would look in it.

TELL ME WHY IT'S MORALLY WRONG?

It's taking somebody else's property. I don't know how to explain it any more. I just think that's morally wrong to take somebody's property, just because she's neglectful should have nothing to do with it.

His reasoning on why it is wrong to steal is not elaborated enough to give John a stage score. He was given a guess 3/4 in his reasoning because of his apparent commitment to fixed societal property rules and rights.

When asked whether a friend of the thief should persuade Tom, the thief, to return the money John uses responsibility reasoning about property and trust as well as deontic judgment. He says, "It would be morally right to return the money. He's

committed a crime and might as well reconcile the crime. It's the friend's obligation to the community to do that....Besides I don't think I could be a friend who condones stealing and not do anything about it."

This is classified as stage 4 responsibility reasoning because John has a strong sense of obligation for restoring the money which he sees as an obligation to the whole community. Friendship ties John elaborates in terms of each to the broader community as well as to each other within the community.

John's thinking about upholding property rights is influenced by his perception of a collective norm of trust in his own school. John says,

> I would not think about taking the money. I would think about closing the pocketbook. I think I should to that. I'm not trusting of groups of people, in general. In this school I would trust leaving some things. If there is a $20 bill on the table; I think in this community a lot of people would not take it. A lot of people would probably turn it in. I think there would be a minimum amount of people that would take the money, especially $20 from an open pocketbook. A majority would not take it. I think there is more of a trust in our school just because there is that emphasis on morality.
>
> DO YOU THINK YOUR SCHOOL DOES HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT TRUST?
>
> There is an understanding about trust. It's discussed in a lot of our community meetings. There is trust that people will abide by the rules of the community and will not break the laws. There is that trust...There is an unwritten code that you don't take somebody's possessions. You can trust people in the school not to take your possessions. You can't trust everyone in a group of 80 students. There are always exceptions. However in the majority I would trust.
>
> WHY DO YOU THINK THAT EXPECTATION EXISTS IN THE SCHOOL AND HOW CAN YOU TELL IT EXISTS?
>
> Why it exists. Because we're sort of a community. In some respects we are just an enlarged family and I would trust everybody in my family. We work as a family, or as a team, or as a community. So I think that's very important. How do you expect people to work together if their trusts are broken by stealing things and things like that.

We scored John's perceptions of the norm of trust as level 13 of collectiveness, a norm that is shared by himself and most others in the group. John's reasons for the existence and maintenance of the norm of trust are stage 4 and grounded in his ideas of the requirements of a cooperative community. As was noted his community valuing

is similar to that which he used in grounding the norm of helping in the caring dilemma. He values the community intrinsically and feels that the group can expect members to uphold the norms necessary for a cooperatively functioning group. This is level 4 of the community valuing and a stage 4 conception of community.

With regard to maintaining the collective norms of property and trust, John's attitudes and perception is Phase 7. He believes the norm should be upheld even though this might require reporting a friend, saying "I think there is a certain trust in this community thatpeople would say something."

With regard to the next dilemma concerned with collective restitution, it is clearly a new idea for John rather than an issue that has actually been raised in his school.

> WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE IDEA OF THE WHOLE CLASS CHIPPING IN TO REPAY MARY? DO YOU THINK THAT'S SOMETHING THAT SHOULD BE DONE?
>
> That's something that should be discussed, obviously. I think people in this school probably would do that. It also in this case might make the person give the money back when he saw his friends had to pay for his mistake. I think that would be a terrific argument to have against my friend. That's definitely something that should be discussed but I can't tell you right now how I feel about it.
>
> OH, YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU WOULD DO IF YOU WERE ASKED, OR HOW YOU WOULD VOTE?
>
> How I would vote. No. There are too many conflicting ideas, Yes, it was stolen but is it my responsibility to pay her back because she was so neglectful. In this case, I would probably...I could argue doing both. That's the problem. I don't know what I'd do.
>
> GIVE ME THE ARGUMENT ON THE SIDE OF WHY EVERYONE SHOULD CHIP IN?
>
> Because it's not the fault of the community that this happened; however, I think it might be the responsibility of the community to pay her back. On the other side, I think I had nothing to do with it. It was, in certain ways, it was really her fault that it was taken. She was being very neglectful and I am not sure that I would have that kind of responsibility to pay her back.

John's idea that the community may have some obligation toward the welfare of the person stolen from even though the community itself is not accountable for the stealing is scored stage 3/4 in the responsibility mode.

Since the idea of collective restitution is a new one for John, he does not perceive it as a collective norm and thus he is scored level 3 on degree of collectiveness, the level of no awareness of a collective norm and no clear opinion pro or con on the group's establishment of such a norm. The phase is zero because there is no perceived collective norm.

Initially John makes a deontic, stage 4 judgment that he should not smoke when asked about upholding an agreement about not smoking on that dilemma.

DO YOU THINK BOB SHOULD REFUSE TO SMOKE?

> No question about it. He should refuse to smoke and he should try at that time to dissuade them from smoking. Its morally wrong. He gave an oath that he would not smoke pot, therefore, he should not smoke pot. And, I don't think peer pressure would affect him at all.

He also makes a stage 4 judgment of responsibility for not smoking. Asked:

DO YOU THINK A GOOD MEMBER OF THE SCHOOL SHOULD REFUSE TO SMOKE.

> Yes, by smoking the pot it would hurt the community their trust would be broke and it might deter the community from making any such important decisions in the future knowing that they might possibly be broken.

The stage of responsibility is stage 4 because it recognizes that keeping promises and maintaining trust is essential for its capacity for making group decisions. John's position about drugs reflects a very strong collective norm. He says, "Most people would refuse to smoke because I think they are all moral people. I think they believe that the community is very important and it is more important than any kind of peer pressure. It's just a general feeling that people have. It's an obligation to uphold the rest of the community. They believe in this community. That's why they came here. They believe in it and they believe that breaking the law would really be hurting the community and it's more important to abide by the rules for the community than to smoke pot."

Since John describes that he and the group share the norm of not smoking viewing it as a rule of the community and a moral obligation to the community, we score the degree of collectiveness of the norm as degree 13.

Turning to the phase of the "no smoking" norm we see that John spontaneously

says that the obligation to the norm includes attempting to persuade the person to stop. If discussion doesn't work, the norm would obligate him and others to report. Asked,

WOULD YOU REPORT?

No question about it. Even if my friends smoke pot...I would have no qualms about it.

DO YOU THINK MOST PEOPLE HERE WOULD ACTUALLY REPORT?

They did. There is a minority that would not though... That's a small minority.

John's sense of a shared majority expectation to report someone smoking is scored as phase 7.

Behind John's strong perception and acceptance of a collective norm about smoking pot is the strong valuing of community. He says, "The community agreed on a rule, therefore they feel a tremendous responsibilty to uphold the law. One of the people who was caught said it was wrong,because I got caught. When he reflected on the process of the law, he had more of an understanding that what he did hurt the community and that he wouldn't do that again. I think that's very important that it was inherently wrong to do that. It just wasn't wrong because he got caught. It's more effective if the kids in the community say, 'hey you really hurt me by smoking pot.' I might not think that smoking pot is bad but we made an agreement and you really hurt me and you really took away a lot from the community." John is level 4, stage 4 in his valuing of community. He values the community instrinsically and feels that the community can obligate its members in special ways in this case to uphold a rule which he sees as abitrary without the community's agreement upon it.

Thus in the "conventional" dilemma about drugs John's response indicates the power of community valuing in S.A.S. to create a strong collective norm about a kind of action about which no strong collective norm had been created in the other 5 schools we have discussed. Becky, who represented The Cluster School, indicated

that The Cluster sense of community did not lead to the upholding of a collective norm of drugs. In Cluster School, on the other hand, the sense of community did lead to a fairly well agreed upon norm of collective responsibility for restitution missing in all the other five schools we have discussed. The differences between John's alternative school perception of collective norms and concern for community contrasts with Debbie's regular school perceptions in ways similar to the contrasts found in Cambridge and Brookline.

E. Summary Data for Brookline and Cambridge

Looking at Tables 10 and 11 which report the median scores for each of four groups in the school dilemmas, we see that the differences between Sonya and Josh and Becky and Rick are prototypical of the difference between democratic alternative school students and regular high school students on responsibility reasoning and on the moral atmosphere for the four schools. Table 11 which gives summary results for the four schools lists the proportion of students in each school that make the choice of social responsibility over the individual responsibility choice. In terms of the content of choice rather than the mode of judgment about it there was a moderate tendency for the democratic schools to lead students to make the prosocial choice as opposed to the individual choice.

When we asked what each student should or would do we considered that to be a part of the evaluation of individual judgments. When we then asked what they thought their peers should or would do, make the prosocial choice or not, we move to consideration and evaluation of the moral atmosphere of each school. In the democratic schools overt 80% of the responses of the students showed that they believed their peers felt they should act prosocially while in regular high schools about 40% of the responses indicated that students believed their peers felt they should act prosocially.

In predicting their peers' behavior, about 60% of the democratic school students' responses indicated that they felt their peers would act consistently with their prosocial choice. In the regular high schools about 30% of the responses showed that students believed their peers would act prosocially.

The disparity between answering for themselves and for others is interesting. While the majority of regular high school students make the prosocial choice for themselves, less than half or one-third feel their peers would make the prosocial choice. This phenomenon seems to be an example of "pluralistic ignorance" and in part, we think, is a result of the school environment which has few opportunities for discussing and creating explicitly shared norms.

In contrast, the data for the democratic schools show closer agreement between the prosocial choice for self and others. The accuracy of democratic alternative school students' perceptions of group choice and group behavior is evidence that pluralistic ignorance can be overcome through the democratic process.

There are sharp differences between the democratic school students and the regular high school students of the frequency of use of responsibility judgments. While half of the responses of alternative school students were in the responsibility mode, only 5–12% of responses made by regular high school students were classified in this mode. Looking at the median stage scores for deontic and responsibility reasoning on the school dilemmas, we see that in both modes the regular high school students' reasoning was one-half to one stage lower than the stages used by democratic alternative school students (see lines 2 and 3, Table 10). This is striking because the median classical moral judgment scores were the same within each pair. Again we feel the democratic process and the explicit valuing of community leads to these results.

Turning to the degree of collectiveness of norms, Table 11 shows that neither regular high school has truly collective norms. The predominance of a score 4 indicates

that the students held only individual norms about caring, trust, etc. In contrast, students in both democratic schools articulated strongly shared norms at degree 11 for SWS and degree 13 for Cluster. Table 6 describes this difference. Most students in SWS felt norms should be upheld because of positive feelings and motivations which they saw as generated spontaneously by being in a close and caring community. Cluster students saw the norms as morally prescriptive, and as generated by a collective decision process.

The median stage of the degree 4 individual norms is 3 for Brookline and 2/3 for Cambridge High School; in both cases one-half stage lower than the median stage for each sample on the classical hypothetical dilemmas. The stage of the collective norms for both democratic schools was 3/4; this is the same or higher than the median stages of both on the classical hypothetical dilemmas.

Degree of community valuing and its median stage give parallel results for the four schools. Cambridge High School students indicated on the whole that they did not value their school even as an educational institution. The scores is 0. Brookline High School students mostly did value their school as an educational institution, a place to go to meet their own academic needs. The score was 1. Both alternative schools were intrinsically valued as communities by their students as is indicated by a score of 3 on Degree of Community Valuing. The stage of community valuing scores reflect these differences. Brookline and Cambridge students conception of their schools as stage 2 and 2/3 places is consistent with not valuing or instrumentally valuing their schools. SWS and Cluster students conceptualized their communities in stage 3/4 and 3 terms respectively. This also is consistent with the expressed valuing of their communities as enabling and promoting caring, trusting and sharing relationships.

In summary, the democratic school students were higher than their regular high school controls in the content of their school dilemma choices — favoring prosocial responsibility, in their mode of judgment -- making judgments of responsibility, and in their stage of judgment. We believe that these differences reflect real differences in moral action in the schools, a belief we support in a detailed history of the alternative schools. We interpret these differences in practical moral judgment as due to the differential moral atmospheres of the democratic and comparison schools The democratic schools have a high sense of collective prosocial norms and a strong sense of community. The methodology that we have described is useful not only for studying the moral atmosphere of the school but also that of the workplace and the family. Pilot extensions the methodology of these other institutions are now underway.

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TABLE 1

Individual Moral Judgments and Choices for the Four Case Studies

	JOSH (BHS)	SONYA (SWS)	RICK (CHS)	BECKY (CLUSTE
1. Classical hypothetical moral judgment stage	3/4 (317 mms)	3/4 (335 mms)	3/4 (321 mms)	3/4 (345 mms)
2. Practical school deontic stage	3/4	3/4	2/3	3
3. Practical school responsibility stage	2/3	3/4	-	3/4
4. Frequency of responsibility judgments	75%	66%	0%	75%
5. Frequency of prosocial choice for self	50%	75%	50%	100%
6. Frequency of predicted prosocial behavior for self	50%	75%	50%	75%

TABLE 2

Perception of Moral Atmosphere for the Four Case Studies

	JOSH (BHS)	SONYA (SWS)	RICK (CHS)	BECKY (CLUSTER)
1. Frequency of perceived prosocial choice for others	0%	75%	50%	100%
2. Frequence of predicted prosocial behavior for others	0%	50%	25%	75%
3. Median Degree of Collectiveness of norms (1- 15)	2 and 5	13	1 and 6	14
4. Median Degree of Community Valuing (1-4)	0	3	1	4
5. Median Stage of Collective Norms	2/3	3/4	2/3	3/4
6. Median Phase of Norms	0	5	0	4
7. Median Stage of Community Valuing	-	3	2/3	3/4

TABLE 3

The Practical School Dilemmas

1. CARING DILEMMA

The college Harry applied to had scheduled an interview with him for the coming Saturday morning at 9:00 a.m. Since the college was 40 miles away from Harry's town and Harry had no way of getting there, his guidance counselor agreed to drive him. The Friday before the interview the guidance counselor told Harry that his car had broken down and was in the repair shop until Monday. He said he felt badly but there was no way he could drive him to his interview. He still wanted to help him out so he went to Harry's homeroom and he asked the students if there was anyone who could drive Harry to the college. No one volunteered to drive him. A lot of students in the class think Harry shows off and talks too much and don't like him. The homeroom teacher says he has to take his children to the dentist at that time. Some students say they can't use the family car, others work, some don't have their licenses. One student, Billy, knows he can use his family car but he wonders whether he should do something for Harry when the few students in class who know him best say they are busy or just can't do it. Besides, he would have to get up really early on a Saturday morning which is the only morning during the week he can sleep late.

1. SHOULD BILLY VOLUNTEER TO DRIVE HARRY TO THE COLLEGE? WHY OR WHY NOT?

2. RESTITUTION DILEMMA

Tom took the money. When Mary returns to the classroom she looks into her pocket book and notices the twenty dollar bill is missing. She goes to the teacher and tells what has happened. The teacher asks the person to return the money but no one does. Zeke, a friend of Tom's, saw him take the money.

1. SHOULD ZEKE PERSUADE TOM TO RETURN THE MONEY? WHY?

2. IF ZEKE TRIES TO PERUSADE TOM TO RESTITUTE AND TOM WILL NOT SHOULD ZEKE REPORT TOM TO THE TEACHER?

3. IF NO ONE IN THE CLASS ADMITS TO TAKING THE MONEY OR KNOWING WHO DID IT, WHAT SHOULD THE TEACHER DO? WHY?

4. WOULD THERE BE A GENERAL FEELING OR AN EXPECATION IN YOUR SCHOOL THAT EVERYONE SHOULD CHIP IN? ARE PEOPLE SUPPOSED TO CHIP IN?

5. WOULD YOU EXPECT ALL MEMBERS OF YOUR SCHOOL TO CHIP IN? WOULD YOU FEEL THAT ANY MEMBER OF YOUR SCHOOL, BECAUSE S/HE IS A MEMBER OF YOUR SCHOOL SHOULD CHIP IN? WHY?

3. STEALING DILEMMA

When Mary arrived at her history class, she notices that although the students were all there the teacher had not arrived. She sat down for a few seconds but decided to chat with a few of here friends in the hall until her teacher came. She opened her pocketbook, pulled out a letter she wanted to show her friends and ran out of the classroom, leaving her pocketbook unsnapped and lying on her desk. Tom, a student in the class looks into Mary's pocketbook and sees a twenty dollar bill. He thinks about taking the twenty dollar bill from her pocketbook.

1. WHAT DO YOU THINK A STUDENT LIKE TOM WOULD DO IN A SITUATION LIKE THIS? WHY?

2. SHOULD MARY HAVE BEEN TRUSTING LIKE THAT IN THIS SITUATION OR SHOULD SHE HAVE BEEN MORE CAREFUL?

4. DRUG DILEMMA

Before the junior class trip the faculty told the students the whole class had to make an agreement not to bring or use alcohol or drgus on the trip. If students were found using drugs or alcohol they would be sent home. The students knew that without faculty approval they won't be able to have their trip. The students said in a class meeting they all agreed to these conditions. On the trip, several students ask Bob, a fellow student, to go on a hike with them to the lake. When they get to the lake, they light up a joint and pass it around.

1. SHOULD BOB REFUSE TO SMOKE? WHY OR WHY NOT?

TABLE 4

A Classical Dilemma from Form B of the Standard Hypothetical Interview

LOUISE'S DILEMMA

Judy was a twelve-year-old girl. Her mother promised her that she could go to a special rock concert coming to their town if she saved up from babysitting and lunch money for a long time so she would have enough money to buy a ticket to the concert. She managed to save up the $5 the ticket cost plus another $3. But then her mother changed her mind and told Judy that he had to spend the money on new clothes for school. Judy was disappointed and decided to go to the concert anyway. She bought a ticket and told her mother that she had only been able to save $3. That Saturday she went to the performance and told her mother that she was spending the day with a friend. A week passed without her mother finding out. Judy then told her older sister, Louise, that she had gone to the performance and had lied to her mother about it. Louise wonders whether to tell their mother what Judy did.

1. SHOULD LOUISE, THE OLDER SISTER, TELL THEIR MOTHER THAT JUDY HAD LIED ABOUT THE MONEY OR SHOULD SHE KEEP QUIET?

TABLE 5

Criteria for Judgments of Responsibility and Stages of Responsibility Judgments

A. Judgments of responsibility go beyond deontic judgments in one of four ways:

1. Judgments which consider the needs and welfare of the other as an individual where the other's welfare seems to be a matter of a right or claim the other has or where it is a matter of not harming the other's welfare is a deontic concern. Judgments which consider filling the other's need when it is not based on a right or claim or where it is a matter of enhancing his welfare not only preventing harm is a responsibility concern.

2. Judgments of responsibility consciously consider the involvement and implication of the self in the action or in the welfare consequences to the other.

3. Judgments of personal moral worth (aretaic) of the kind of self the actor wants to be (perfecting character) or would be if he failed to perform the action (judgments of blame, guilt, loss of integrity) are judgments of responsibility when explicitly used as a basis for action rather than rights and/or obligations.

4. Judgments that use an intrinsic valuing of social relationships such as friendship or relationships of community as justification for performing a moral action are judgments of responsibility.

B. Stages of Responsibility Judgments:

Stage 1 - Responsibility and obligation are seens as being the same. The person feels compelled to fulfill the commands of superiors, authority figures or the rules given by them.

Stage 2 - Responsibility is differentiated from obligation from this stage onward. The person is responsibile only to and for himself, his welfare, property, and goals.

Stage 2/3 - There is a recognition that everyone is responsibilbe to and for themselves, their welfare, property, and goals. Persons who are irresponsible or careless lose some of the right to have themselves and their welfare, etc., respected. For example, being careless mitigates the right to have one's property respected as well as justifying a lessened concern for the person's welfare.

Stage 3 - Responsibility for the self is to do the "good" thing, to live up to generally known and accepted standards of a "good person". Responsibility to others is limited to those with whom one has a personal relationship and is defined as meeting their needs or promoting their welfare.

Stage 3/4 - Responsibility is seen more as a process for maintaining and enhancing feelings of closeness and affection in personal relationships. Being irresponsible is defined as "hurting the other's feelings" within a relationship and is considered a valid basis for a lessened concern of the other's welfare.

Stage 4 - Responsibility is seens as a mutually binding set of feelings and agreements among people in relationships, groups or communities. Being responsible for the self means one must act out of dependability, trustworthiness and loyalty regardless of fluctuating feelings among people. Irresponsibility on the part of those people within the same group does not mitigate concern for their welfare or rights by other group members.

TABLE 6

Degree of Collectiveness of Norms

1.	I--Rejection:	No one can make a rule or agreement in this school which would be followed or taken seriously. Descriptive. I as an individual. No group constituency.
2.	I--Conscience:	An action in accordance with the norm should not be expected or demanded by the group because it should be left to each individual's free choice. Prescriptive. Could be descriptive. I as an individual.
3.	I--No Awareness:	Does not perceive the existence of a shared norm concerning this issue and does not take a position pro or con about the groups' developing such a norm. Also does not have an individual norm concerning this issue. Descriptive. I as an individual.Group constituency.
4.	I--Individual:	An action should be perfored which is in accordance with the norm where this action is not defined or implied by membership in the group. There is no suggestion that the task of the group is or should be to develop or promote the norm. Prescriptive. I as an individual. Constituency -universal, applied to people in the group as much as to people outside the group.
5.	I--Individual Ambiguous:	An action should be performed which is in accordance with the norm where this action is implied by membership in the group. Prescriptive. I as an individual. Constituency -ambiguous but seems to apply to people in the group more than to those outside.
6.	Authority:	An action should be performed because it is expected or demanded by the teacher, administrator whose authority derives from his/her status or the law which makes the teacher a superior member of the group. Prescriptive or Descriptive. Teacher as authority. Group constituency.
7.	Authority-Acceptance:	An action should be performed because it is expected by authority or law with the clear implication that the group accepts this authority and thinks promoting and upholding the norm is in the interest of the group's welfare. Prescriptive. Teacher as authority. Group constituency. The speaker perspective is the individual speaking as if he or she and others have internalized the norm.

8. **They-Aggregate (I disagree):** They the group or a substantial subgroup, have a tendency to act in accordance with a norm in a way that the individual speaker does not share or disagrees with.
Prescriptive or Descriptive. I, as a member of the group.
Group consitituency.

9. **I and They--Aggregate:** They and I have a tendency to act in the same way in accordance with a norm.
Prescriptive or Descriptive. I and they, as members of the group.
Group constituency.

10. **Limiting or Proposing I:** The speaker thinks the group or all members of the group should follow or uphold this norm better or should have this new norm. (This category overlaps with Phase I--Proposing).
Prescriptive. I, as a member of the group.
Group constituency.

11. **Spontaneous--Collective:** They or they and I think that group members should act in accordance with the norm because they feel naturally motivated to do so due to the sense of belonging to the group.
Descriptive. They and I as members of the group.
Group constituency.

12. **They--Limited Collective:** They think that group members should act in accordance with the norm without the speaker identifying himself with that normative expectation. The speaker can differentiate his own normative perspective.
Prescriptive. They, as members of the group.
Group constituency.

13. **I and They -- Limited Collective:** Both I and they, as members of the group, think that group members should act in accordance with the norm.
Prescriptive. I and they, as members of the group.
Group constituency.

14. **Implicit--We Collective:** The members of this group think that all of us should act in accordance with the norm.
Prescriptive. Speaker perspective is group member qua group member.

15. **We Explicit--Collective:** We, the members of this group, think that we should act in accordance with the norm.
Prescriptive. We (explicitly stated), members qua members.
Group constituency.

TABLE 7

Degree of Community Valuing

I.	Instrumental Extrinsic:	the school is valued as an institution that helps the individual to meet his own academic needs.
II.	"Espirit' de Corp" Extrinsic:	The school is valued as an institution that helps the individual and that the individual feels some loyalty toward as manifest in team spirit and support of teams or groups in school.
III.	Spontaneous Community Intrinsic:	The school is valued as the kind of place in which members feel an inner motivation to help others in the group community and the community generates special feelings of closeness among members.
IV.	Communal Intrinsic:	The school as a community is valued for its own sake. Community can obligate it's members in special ways and members can expect special privileges or responsibilites from the group and other members.

TABLE 8

Stages of Collective Normative Values and the Sense of Community Valuing

COLLECTIVE NORMATIVE VALUES	SENSE OF COMMUNITY VALUING
STAGE 2	
There is not yet an explicit awareness of collective normative values. However, there are generalized expectations that individuals should recognize concrete individual rights and resolve conflicts through exchange.	There is no clear sense of community apart from exchanges among group members. Community denotes a collection of individuals who do favors for each other and rely on each other for protection. Community is valued insofar as it meets the concrete needs of its members.
EXAMPLES:	EXAMPLES:
1. Do not "rat" on another group member. Ratting or reporting another group member to authorities is disapproved of because it exposes the rule breaker to likely punishment. 2. Do not bother others. Live and let live. 3. Help others out when you want to.	The community is like a "bank." Members meet to exchange favors but you cannot tak more than you give.
STAGE 3	
Collective normative values refer to relationships among group members. Membership in a group implies living up to shared expectations. Conflicts should be resolved by appeal to mutual collective normative values.	The sense of community refers to a set of relationships and sharings among group members. The group is valued for the friendliness of its members. The value of the group is equated with the value of its collective normative expectations.
EXAMPLES:	EXAMPLES:
1. Members of a group should be able to trust each other with their possessions. 2. Members of a group should care about other members of the group.	1. The community is a family in which members care for each other. 2. The community is honorable because it helps others.

COLLECTIVE NORMATIVE VALUES	SENSE OF COMMUNITY VALUING
STAGE 4	
Collective normative values stress the community as an entity distinct from its individual members. Members are obligated to act out of concern for the welfare and harmony of the group.	The school is explicitly valued as an entity distinct from the relationships among its members. Group commitments and ideals are valued. The community is perceived as an organic whole composed of interrelated systems that carry on the functioning of the group.
EXAMPLES:	EXAMPLES:
1. Individuals not only are responsible for themselves but share responsibility for the whole group. 2. Individuals should participate in the political organization of the group by making their opinions known and by being informed voters.	Stealing affects "the community more than the individual because that is what we are. We are not just a group of individuals."

TABLE 9

Phases of the Collective Norm

Phase 0: No collective norm exists of is proposed.

COLLECTIVE NORM PROPOSAL
Phase 1: Individuals propose collective norms for group acceptance.

COLLECTIVE NORM ACCEPTANCE
Phase 2: Collective norm is accepted as a group ideal but not agreed to. It is not an expectation for behavior.

a) some group members accept ideal
b) most group members accept ideal

Phase 3: Collective norm is accepted and agreed to but it is not (yet) an expectation for behavior.

a) some group members agree to collective norm
b) most group members agree to collective norm

COLLECTIVE NORM EXPECTATION
Phase 4: Collective norm is accepted and expected. (Naive expectation)

a) some group members expect the collective norm to be followed
b) most group members expect the collective norm to be followed

Phase 5: Collective norm is expected but not followed (Disappointed expectation)

a) some group members are disappointed
b) most group members are disappointed

COLLECTIVE NORM ENFORCEMENT
Phase 6: Collective norm is expected and upheld through expected persuading of deviant to follow norm.

a) some group members persuade
b) most group members persuade

Phase 7: Collective norm is expected and upheld through expected reporting of defiant to the group.

a) some group members report
b) most group members report.

TABLE 10

Summary of Results for Four Schools:
Group Medians of Individual Moral Judgments and Choices.

	BROOKLINE HIGH SCHOOL	SCHOOL-WITHIN-A-SCHOOL	CAMBRIDGE HIGH SCHOOL	CLUSTER SCHOOL
1. Median Classical hypothetical moral judgment stage.	3/4 (318mms)*	3/4 (330mms)*	3 (287mms)*	3 (305mms)*
2. Median Practical School Deontic stage.	3	3/4	2/3	3
3. Median Practical School responsibility stage.	2/3	3/4	3	3/4
4. Frequency of responsibility judgments	12%	55%	3%	46%
5. Frequency of Prosocial Choice for Self	75%	86%	66%	83%
6. Frequency of Predicted Prosocial Behavior for Self	61%	77%	63%	74%
7. Number of students	10	16	15	20

Note: *MMS is the moral maturity score.

TABLE 11

Summary of Results for Four Schools:

The Moral Atmosphere

	BROOKLINE HIGH SCHOOL	SCHOOL-WITHIN-A-SCHOOL	CAMBRIDGE HIGH SCHOOL	CLUSTER SCHOOL
1. Frequency of perceived Prosocial choice for others	34%	81%	45%	84%
2. Frequency of predicted prosocial behavior of others	26%	67%	34%	58%
3. Median degree of collectiveness of norms (1- 15)	4	11	4	13
4. Median degree of community valuing (1-4)	1	3	0	3
5. Stage of collective norm as represented at median degree or above of collectiveness	3	3/4	2/3	3/4
6. Median stage of community valuing	2	3/4	2/3	3

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